Archives For

Breaking down #37

Bill Bridges —  July 9, 2009

Can there be yet another post about Ron Artest? Answer: There can never be enough posts about #37! This post will try to find evidence to support some popular hypotheses – some posed by yours truly.

Let’s start on defense.

Hypothesis #1. Ron is an excellent on-ball defender.

Seems silly to doubt this point as Ron has been a Defensive Player of the Year. But let’s see if the numbers back this up.  Of course defensive stats are notoriously hard to quantify.  One stat is opponent’s PER.

We see from 82games.com that Cleveland has the best PER against small forwards at 12.6 and Houston was second at 13.5. So far so good. Looking into the Cavs and Rockets in more detail shows that Lebron’s defensive PER was a good 13.5. Of course the Rockets also have Battier who was at 12.3. However Artest was even better at 12.2. By the PER-against metric, it is safe to say that Ron is an elite on-ball defender. (Bowen was 16.3 and Ariza 23.0). Versus Ariza, a significant upgrade.

Hypothesis #2. Ron’s true value will be evident against the top teams in the league.

How does Ron play against Lebron, Melo, and Pierce. The three best players on the best teams in the NBA not called the Lakers?

We see that all three performed below their career averages. Pierce came closest to matching his career numbers. Lebron especially has had problems with Artest (No wonder he recruited Artest so hard). James’ 5.1 turnovers per game really stand out. Impressively, Artest’s team has a win/loss advantage against all three players. 7-3 against Lebron is no joke. These records include results when Artest was with losing teams in Chicago and Sacramento. By the way, Lebron’s record against Bruce Bowen with over 50% shooting and at 29 ppg.

Contrast these results with Artest’s record against Kobe.
Kobe has being torching Artest ever since Artest came into the league. 48% shooting, 41% from 3 and a 15-5 record. Are you kidding. No wonder Ron wanted to join the Lakers.

Back to the study. The results seem to support hypothesis #2. Ron seems to be as an effective defender against the big three as there is in the league. check.

What about on offense?

Can Artest fit into the triangle and assume Ariza’s role and possibly even extend it?

Let’s first look at Ariza’s shot chart over the past year. First of all, Trevor has no mid-range or low post game. Almost all of his shots came from the 3 point line or at the hoop via penetration.

Before seeing this chart, I’d thought that most of his threes came from the wing – especially the left. In fact, (by a small amount) Trevor took more corner threes than wing threes. I guess our memories want to retain successful events as his corner 3 percentage was horrible. He shot 31.9% from three point range. But crucially was at 40% from the wing. In the playoffs, it seemed as if Phil tweaked the angle of the triangle to get Trevor wing three pointers rather than corners.

Fortunately Artest has almost exactly the same profile as Ariza from the three point line – but better. Simply great from either wing and straight ahead. The left corner let him down but overall a .399 result is one of the league’s best. He shot alot of wing 3′s and should get wide open shots off of passes from Pau and Kobe – especially on the left wing where he shot 126 3′s and made 44%. Can you picture it? Kobe posts down on the right low block. Double comes. Kick out to Artest for the wing 3…. nothing but net.

That is the good news.

Unfortunately, at least during the last year, Ron was awful shooting from virtually every other location. Most troubling is Ron’s inability to finish at the hoop. A .451 at the hoop is almost Fishesque. Compare this to Ariza’s .619 (Kobe was a stud at .622). Except in Ron’s case, he doggedly takes it to the rim – and misses.  Others have written about these strange numbers. Tom Martin’s hypothesis is that Ron’s ankle injury early in the season eroded explosiveness. This seems to have some validity as previous to 08/09, Artest’s success rate at the rim has been about 55%.

The data indicates that Artest is not a good low post player. Nor does he post up often. This could possibly be due to the systems he played in. In Indiana, O’Neal dominated the post. Sacramento didn’t emphasize it. In Houston, obviously Yao was down low. One thing we can agree on is that if Ron stays on the wing and shoots wide open catch n shoot 3′s we will be happy.

Putting it all together. Artest is a significant upgrade as an on-ball defender versus Ariza. He might not be as effective as a weakside help defender. While data to prove or disprove this point does not exist, his high on/off court differential of +5.9. (Ariza is a -5.3) indicates that Artest is a very good team defender. And as we saw, he is as much of a King-stopper as there is in the league.

On offense he plugs in as the wing shooter. And while we have all seen him bully his way past Walton or Lamar from the low block, the data simply doesn’t indicate that he is effective consistently from there. The key question is whether he can run the pinch post drop pass sequence with Pau and finish at the rim as successfuly as Trevor did.

Finally, will he be a black hole on offense?  Maybe. First why he might actually move the ball; he played the triangle for 3 seasons under Tim Floyd. Second, with Kobe and Pau he isn’t likely to be the initiator. If he remains as the finisher and safety valve the Laker’s highly efficient offense should remain so. With the counter; why might he still dribble for 12 seconds before forcing a contested jumper? He is Ron Artest. #37

Oh and here’s is Kobe’s sick shooting chart.  The man can finish at the rim.

—Bill Bridges

The art of negotiation is one of mankind’s most evolved skills. Humans evolved into our present relatively properous state because of our ancestors (for the most part) realized that bartering and trading increases overall wealth and welfare and the means of maximizing ones welfare is via negotiation. Reasonable discussion to reach understanding, history has shown, and all of us agree, is preferable to fisticuffs.

So it is not surprising that negotiation has evolved into a discipline, a science. Taught at the finest of higher learning establishments, fueled by gurus such as Bill Ury, most people agree that superior negotiation skills is an important corner stone to career success. Unless you are a sports agent.

Bill Ury’s seminal work “Getting to Yes” speaks of reaching common ground with your adversary. Ury espouses quite common sense concepts such as:

  • Treat your opponent with respect
  • Put yourself in their shoes
  • Don’t deduce their intentions from your fear
  • Don’t blame them for your problem
  • Discuss each other’s perceptions
  • Face saving: make your proposals consistent with their values
  • Be patient
  • Speak about yourself, not about them
  • Speak for a purpose
  • Build a working relationship
  • For a wise solution reconcile interests, not positions
  • Ask “Why?” Ask “Why not?” Think about their choice
  • Realize that each side has multiple interests

Unless you are a sports agent.

If you are David Lee, and your qualification as “training” as sports agent is repeated watching of “Jerry MaGuire” on late night TV, you eschew any serious study of the science of negotiation.  After all, didn’t you take audit “So you want to be a Sports Agent, Intro” class at your junior college? Instead of learning from the master negotiators and teachers, you adopt the Hitlerian techniques of:

  • Denounce your opponent in public
  • Paint your opponent in a corner
  • Threaten your opponent with consequences and repercussions
  • Complain about lack of appreciation from your opponent (Boo hoo, my feeling is hurt)
  • Blame your opponent for the lack of agreement

Especially since you saw that when Shaq publicly called out Jerry Buss (“Pay me”, “Pay me”) he caved and paid Shaq whatever he wanted….. wait, maybe Jerry and the Lakers didn’t cave. In fact, the Lakers have demonstrated time and time again that they will not be bullied, like to handle matters in private; and when you treat them the right way, they always treat you fairly.

In John Belushi’s immortal words, “But Noooooo….”

If the failure to learn from history is a sign of stupidity, then consider yourself labeled. It takes a special sort of skill to achieve what David Lee has been able to achieve.

Your client is a role player one year removed from a season ending foot fracture. (There are well-reported fears of a congential foot defect). Your client was a bench player for half the season and his highest points per game was not double digits. Yet he has certain advantages:

1. His team has just won the championship and the GM has stated publicly that his intention is to re-sign your client (You sneered at such weak negotiation skills)

2. Your client is a native of the city, with family and friends.

3. The system the team plays is a perfect fit for your client, who cannot create his own shot

4. Your client is part of a tight community. His teammates and coaches love him and vice versa

6. Your client wants to continue to play for the team

7. The team is the marquee team in the league, playing in a top 2 market, for the champion. Your client will never have more chances to maximize his celebrity into endorsement money.

8. Contrary to how you are spinning it your client, not the burly guy with the words in his hair, was option A , not option B.

Thus, even during the worst bear market for free agents – a buyer’s market – the team is willing to pay your client more than any other team.

And you still can’t get the deal done. Instead, your client has to sign for a team out of contention in now his fourth state (you know that it is hot and humid in Houston right?) for less money than he was offered by the Lakers. This takes a special skill. Your client should have stayed home with family and friends, playing for a champion, in the spotlight, and for more money. But you blew it.

The only reason David Lee does not take the “Worst Sports Agent” in history is because in 2003, Anthony Carter’s agent, Bill Duffy (now gainfully unemployed as a mortgage salesman) failed to file papers with the Miami Heat that his client was exercising his option to remain with the team for $4.1 Million. Surprised at not finding such paperwork, Pat Riley immediately cut Carter and signed Lamar Odom with the increased cap space.

So in the pantheon of worst sports agents in history the standings are as follows:

Gold: Bill Duffy

Silver: David Lee

Bronze: Everybody else.

Don’t worry David, you have plenty of time to catch up to Duffy. Or maybe not.

—Bill Bridges

Olympics Day 16 - Basketball
The focus of the pre-series review has emphasized that the Magic pose match-up problems for the Lakers. Perhaps. However, I contend that the matchup problems that the Lakers pose for the Magic dwarf the former. Gasol against Lewis, Odom against Lewis, Tukoglu, or Pietrus. Kobe against Lee. I like these match ups.

The mis-match advantage, the Lakers’ superior training partners, and the proven ability of Jackson and staff to make the correct adjustments leads me to the conclusion that the championship is for the Lakers’ to lose.

The Chuckster is fixated on the starting Orlando forwards. “Whose going to guard Lewis and Turkoglu?”, he asks rhetorically. Lamar Odom and Trevor Ariza, Chuck, that’s who. Chuckster is obsessed by the first 5 minutes of each half when Ariza and Gasol start at the forward spot.

So how will the Magic take advantage of this mis-match? Ariza on Turkoglu? No mis-match there. Then how will Lewis punish Gasol? Not by posting him up obviously. By shooting perimeter shots? As Memo knows, Lewis will be surprised at how good Gasol is at defending the perimeter jumpshot. He will find that shooting jumpers over the length of Pau’s outstretched fingers not quite as easy as shooting over Mo Williams or Delonte West. Lewis’ best chance is to take Gasol on the drive. Even here as well the advantage is not so clear cut. 

Unlike Turkoglu, Lewis is mainly comfortable going right. Against one-handed players, the Lakers’ SSZ is particularly good at throttling penetration. Also unlike Turkoglu, Lewis is not gifted with handle. Making Lewis a penetrator off the dribble creates steal opportunities for the Lakers. The other problem with the Magic trying to take advantage of this “mis-match” is that they will be taken out of their pattern. Once Odom substitutes for Bynum, the “mis-match” disappears for the Magic (although it remains for the Lakers). So if they are to attack the match up, it has to be done early in the 1st and 3rd quarters. The first quarter for the Magic is all about trying to estab lish Howard in the post and distributing shots to their perimeter players. Lewis is the least active in the 1st quarter and usually gets it going as the game progresses – a sort of anti-Josh Howard. Are they going to make Lewis their go-to-guy instead of Howard? If they do, thank you,  SVG. 

On the other side of the ball, Phil must see Gasol versus Lewis and be licking his pleasingly-smooth chops. Move Gasol around on the block, get him the ball, make strong cuts and what do you have? Single-covered, easy scores by Gasol. Double-covered, layups by cutters, open 3′s by Ariza/Fish/Kobe, and fouls on Howard defending the basket. This mis-match might become such a problem that I predict that SVG is the first to blink and play a Howard/Gortat front line to counter.

We know enough about these Lakers to be able to write down the ingredients that trouble them.

- Lightning fast, penetrating guards

- Bruising, athletic, tough front-line that crash the boards.

- Perimeter 3 point shooting

The Magic’s quickest guard Lue, gets no playing time. In Gasol, Bynum, Odom, Mbenga, and Powell, the Lakers’ bigs have the toughness advantage. Only the 3 point shooting is left. But is it really a weakness? Just because Jeff Van Gundy says that the Lakers are poor at 3 point defense doesn’t make it so. In fact, the Lakers were the third best team in the league in defensive 3 point FG% at 34.5%. The problem for the Lakers is that Orlando takes so many, 26 per game, the most in the league, and have myriad of ways getting open looks.

1. The Turkoglu/Howard high screen and roll creates strong-side dribble penetration and rotations. Lee/Pietrus waits on the strong side corner and Lewis on the weakside 3. 

2.  Deep post by Howard. If you double, he kicks out to the top or wing. Shoot the initial 3 or pass around the perimeter for a corner 3.

If you rush at the shooters, they take it to the defender’s feet and to the hole. Unlike Denver, who looked to dunk, the Magic players look to kick the ball back out to the top for the corner 3 or the hockey passes to the corner.

Of course the on occasion Turkoglu and Alston like to go one-on-one for a low percentage possession. Whilst to be incouraged, the defense cannot rely on these infrequent brain-farts.

As the other 90% of possessions are occupied running the two plays above, the Magic are very well practiced and execute extremely well. But an offense with limited options can be stopped. For the first time in the post season the Magic will encounter a team who can switch on the high screen and roll without creating mis-matches. Switch and show cuts off the driving lanes and bottles #2 from the beginning. 

This leaves #1. And frankly whilst in theory Bynum, with his length and strength should be able to bother Howard just as much as Perkins, he’s never displayed this in practice. Assuming Howard cannot be checked one-on-one, the Lakers present unorthodox help defense against the post with the help some times coming from the top, base line and weakside. The natural SSZ defense is most susceptible to the pass from the strong side low post to the weak side corner. Howard rarely makes this pass. Instead, his outlets are almost to the top and the wing not the corner. By the last 2 games, the Lakers were much better at recovering back to cover the corner 3. If can’t defend Howard on defense, you must be able to attack him on offense.

Of the final four teams, the Lakers are the only ones with the bigs that will attack Howard. The truth is that Howard simply is not a great own-man low post defender, kind of like Ben Wallace. He can be backed under the hoop in early transition and sealed. If Bynum plays with aggression and his team mates look for him, Howard just might have to work on man defense for the first time this playoffs. 

The Magic is comprised of weak individual defenders (with the possible exception of Pietrus and of course, Howard) who execute a scheme. The crux of the scheme is not doubling and staying with perimeter shooters. Against the Cavs, with no post presence, this scheme is perfect. Against the Lakers who can post up Gasol and Odom against Lewis, this scheme breaks down. Once the Magic double down low, their sticky perimeter defense is gone. Wide open shots and driving lanes should present themselves. If Howard gets in foul trouble every single game when the lanes are closed and he need not play any man defense, the Lakers could cause serious foul issues for the Magic.

The road to the finals also favors the Lakers. Apollo Creed identified hand and foot quickness as Rocky’s weakness. So he had him chasing chickens. You have a problem guarding quick point guards and perimeter shooters; practice against Houston for 7 games. Tough athletic post players have pushed you around in the past? Practice against Denver for 6 games. Ali prepared for Foreman by sparring against Ernie Shavers, not a light weight. 

In contrast, non of the teams the Magic has played thus far has prepared them for the challenges that the Lakers bring. They had so many physical mis-matches against the Cavs that it was like seeing Ali beat up on the light-heavyweight champion, Bob Foster. But this practice was no preparation against Ken Norton who broke Ali’s jaw.

Assuming that the Lakers have cured themselves of the Malaise of the early rounds and brings effort each night, 4 games or 5 is a possibility.

—Bill Bridges
 

 

Time to Mix it Up

Bill Bridges —  December 15, 2008

NBA 2008 - Lakers Beat Timberwolves 98-86
Every Laker fan is also a Laker critic. It is a divine right of the Laker fan to complain if the team does not meet lofty expectations and blow out each opponent. Much has been said and written about the new Lakers defense. But the switch in performance and the magnified switch in fan sentiment regarding the Laker’s defense is probably unparalleled. At the beginning of the season, the new “strong-side zone” defense masterminded by the new Defensive Coordinator Kurt Rambis had lifted the team to #1 in total defense prompting national media attention and admiration. Recently, the same SSZ defense is prompting ridicule from the likes of perennial all-defensive-team stalwart, Mark Jackson: “The Lakers are a bad defensive team…”

It is as if the ’74 Steel Curtain transformed into the ’08 Detroit lions in the span of 4 games. So it is time to strip away the rhetoric and opinions and try to examine this defense objectively and render a fair critique. In so doing, there are at least 3 separate components.

1. The strategy. The over-all structure of the defense. What is the scheme? What is the objective? 

2. Execution. Are the players executing the strategy with effort?

3. The personnel. Do the players have the skills to execute the strategy?

The Strategy.  The goal is to take advantage of the new zone defence rules to create a hybrid defense. The strong-side players actually play man-to-man. Ball placement in the wing area draws the weak-side post player to the strong-side mid post who zones off that region, preventing penetration and help either to the high or low post. As Frank Hamblen recently said, each player is playing his man and ½ of another by being ready to provide help for his team-mates. In the beginning of the season, the help was more judiciously applied such as when the opponent had picked up his dribble, or in the corners. This is a trap. The offensive player is put under pressure resulting in sub-optimal results such as errant passes. More recently the help has been coming at all times. This is doubling – not trapping. Doubling John Salmons when he is still has his dribble is not smart. This help is easy to beat with a quick pass out to the top, resulting in defensive scramble, and invariably, an open shot. 

The result of this constant helping? Reduced steals, open looks and wide open lanes for dribble penetration. If the strategy is of the defense is to pick and choose trap opportunities, the team has not been executing it.

On high screen and rolls, the strategy seems to be, with no regard for the opposition, a hard show by the bigs with the man covering the ball (usually Fisher or Farmar) NOT fighting through or going under the screens but covering the zone between Bynum/Pau and their men until the bigs begin their retreat back to the basket at which time, Fisher/Farmar re-engage with their men.  Because they have constant “show” help, Fisher/Farmar are playing their men very tight, trying to disrupt the offense.  

There are two issues problems with this strategy. Any move played without variation, whether in chess, or baseball pitches, will be beaten. The bigs should sometimes NOT show, just to change the rhythm. Second, the tight play by Fisher/Farmar (not the quickest of guards anyway – more later) only make them easier to beat off the dribble even without the aid of a pick.

My observation is that if you had to pick one strategic move causing the Lakers the most problems is their tight-coverage/constant-show on the screen and roll. This strategy is the wrong one for this team and because of it the entire defense breaks down due to the resulting dribble penetration. Dribble penetration exposes the bigs who have to help, bring their man toward the hoop and whether the outcome is a layup, foul, open 3, or offensive rebound, the chances are that the results are not good.

Execution. I don’t believe that the execution has really changed much throughout the year. Defensive execution is about coaching and basketball IQ. By the time a player has made the NBA and he still has not learned to keep between his man and the hoop while keeping an eye on the ball, it is probably too late for him to learn. There are several Lakers who apparently have not learned this simple skill. One of the reasons for the benching of the stronger, quicker, taller Vlade for Luke is that Luke has these fundamental skills while Vlade does not. Farmar never had these skills and Lamar seems to have lost his. 

As far as effort, I actually think the players are trying harder than they were at the beginning of the season. But to quote the Wizard, “don’t mistake activity for achievement”. Constant doubling demands a lot of hard work. Unfortunately such indiscriminate activity puts the defense in easy-to-exploit scramble mode. More lazy, but discriminate trapping would be far more effective.

Personnel. No matter the validity of the strategy and degree of execution. These two factors have to fit the characteristics of the personnel. For the most part, an aggressive trapping defense fits well. In Kobe, Ariza, and Odom, the Lakers have disruptive wing players who can both provide trap pressure and intercept errant passes.  Although even here recently (perhaps spurred on by the wager made by several players on highest steals totals) too many steals attempts are being made on passes to the middle rather than cross court. A missed steal on a cross court pass gives team mates a chance to rotate over. A missed steal to a pass to the free throw line to the top of the key creates a wide open lane.

Where the strategy does not fit with the personnel is the idea that the wing players should constantly funnel their man baseline to the bigs and the aforementioned hard show on the screen and roll. Funnelling the man to the hoop requires having a big that can change the shot without fouling. A Zo, Wallace, even Chandler.

Against the Kings recently, Bynum showed he has simply has not learned how to defend a small attacking the basket without fouling. Bynum’s best defense is against other bigs (Amare, Bogut, Jefferson), not help defence against smalls. He has to decide whether he is going to block the shot, make a hard foul, or get out of the way. Doing none of the three results in feeble denial attempts that results in an and-more often than any 7’ 285 pound center who can dunk without jumping should ever give up. Kwame has shown (and Roy Hibbert of all players has echoed) that merely standing straight up with arms straight in the air is an incredible deterrent. Bynum has to be coached to play help defence with intent and purpose. Surely he must be tired to making a half-hearted attempt to block a small’s layup a step too slow only to be charged for a foul. I know that I am. As I am tired of his inevitable whining about the unjust call.  Maybe the wing player should just play good defense, move their feet and draw a charge (heaven forbid) instead of letting their man go base line.

Also, whether it is due to lack of quickness or desire, Bynum simply is unable to show hard and get back to his man. 

If you are watching the defense intently, the sheer lack of defensive skills and instincts of Farmar is quite shocking. I wrote in the Kings game thread that the defense would be better without Farmar at all and the Lakers playing  4 on 5 as at least then his man might be tempted to shoot the open jumper instead of abusing Farmar at will and driving to the hoop. It is as if his coach had not taught him to watch his man’s belly instead of his eyes or the ball. Every twitch of the ball handler had Farmar jumping until his man decided to take him out of his misery and blow by him. Farmar might be that rare athlete who is fast when running straight with the ball to the hoop while being slow moving laterally, and explosive  and strong when rising for a dunk but not when fighting through a pick. 

Both point guard’s inability to keep their men in front of them and the scramble that the hard show creates should result in the Defensive Coordinator adjusting and changing the strategy.

My suggestions on what this change could be are:

1. The default defense for screen roll should be for the bigs not to show and the guard to go under the screen. I would much rather have Udrih taking long jump shots or trying to initiate the offense from the three point line than having a straight line to the basket. Show occasionally to mix it up.

2. If you show, rarely do it with Bynum. And never do it if a Bynum/Farmar combo is the defense.

3. Do show with Lamar. He is the best show help defender on the team. His screen and roll defense against Tony Parker 2 seasons ago was a revelation. When Lamar is on the floor, put him against the big that usually sets the high screen and roll. 

4. Whatever you do. Change is up. 

5. Consider putting Ariza on the point. Much like San Antonio, make the point guard shoot over a taller quicker player who can play off him as a result of his size. Considering the dearth of wings who can play from the post, if Parker isn’t exposed on defense neither will be Fisher.

6. Play straight man defense sometimes. Again, change it up. The current defense is akin to an all out blitz. This works for a while but then the offense will screen pass you to death and eventually figures out a blocking scheme to kill you over the top. The triangle is fluid, changing and morphing to adapt to the defense. Why can’t the defense adapt to the offense?

Despite the “sky is falling” laments from the fan base I think we should take heart in the performance so far. Think of the first 23 games as practice for a new kind of hybrid defense. Constant practice has made them better at it but constant use has made them vulnerable to the opposition. Now it is time to use it as just one of their many options in a multi-dimensional, adaptive defense that leverages the strengths of their personnel whilst hiding the players’ natural weaknesses.

—Bill Bridges

This post is by regular here Bill Bridges.

This piece talks about why there might be a reason to match the Warrior’s outsized (we think) offer for Ronny. I’ve covered in an another post why from a purely economic theory point of view that the Lakers might not be impacted financially from signing Ronny.

The signing of Ronny also serves as a signaling mechanism to all other teams. In Texas Holdem, if you bet pre-flop but check after the flop, you’ve signaled that your hand is weak to the others (you can of course bluff, but let’s not focus on that for the moment). To signal to the others that your hand is enhanced by the flop (and induce them to fold), you have to bet or increase the bet. Consistent play establishes you as a player not to mess with. When you raise, you want to them to fold. Animals do this with colors and other displays to demonstrate to others “don’t mess with me and waste your time”.

Translated to game theory, you want to utilize a strategy that signals to your rivals to optimize your results whilst expending the least resources. Taking strong action to a rival’s actions forces the rivals to temper their actions in the future.

If other teams judge that you are unlikely to match offers made to restricted or unrestricted free agents, they are more likely to come after your players. This is the state that the Clippers live in. Sterling is judged as a cheap skate. He has previously signaled to his rivals that he is sensitive to price. Hence, rivals are likely to come after his players. Other cheap teams like the Suns suffer as their free agents (Joe Johnson, James Jones etc) are taken from them. Offers to the Clippers and Suns players are unlikely to be matched therefore the GM’s efforts are rewarded and not a waste of time and resources.

On the other hand, a strong signal to the rivals that all offers will be matched will make them less likely to come after your players. After all, if the Lakers match GS’s offer, Golden state will have wasted a week during which other free agents might be getting signed. This strong signal will ultimately result in teams feeling shy about signing Sasha, Farmar, and later, Bynum. Less competition for their own free agents will ultimately result in an overall lower cost of human resources for the Lakers in the long term.